The Quartering Act was passed by the British Parliament in 1765 as an amendment to existing legislation, the Mutiny Act. It required the American colonies to contribute to the housing and supply of British soldiers in America. This caused a degree of outrage in the colonies, where many interpreted it as both a measure to establish a standing army in America and another form of taxation on Americans.
ContentsIn an era before large military bases and camps and transporting the means to build them, garrisoning and housing soldiers in faraway places like the American colonies was problematic. Governments, in general, had to rely on existing buildings and infrastructure.
This did not extend to private homes, however. In England, it had long been illegal to house soldiers in private homes without the consent of the homeowner. The country’s 1698 Bill of Rights specifically prohibited it, declaring that citizens “not be burdened with the sojourning of soldiers against their will”.
One of the instruments the British Parliament used to maintain effect order and conditions in the army was the Mutiny Act. Also passed in 1689, the Mutiny Act was initially a response to uprisings in military ranks, hence its name. After this, the act was renewed and updated every year. It contained regulations on maintaining and enforcing discipline.
In addition, the Mutiny Act also contained instructions and regulations for the housing and provisioning of soldiers. This included a clause that allowed soldiers, where necessary, to be quartered in private barns, buildings or vacant homes. This was permissible only where suitable barracks or hotel accommodation was not available.
Until 1765, the terms of the Mutiny Act only applied within Britain and not in the American colonies. This anomaly created some difficult situations for British commanders in North America during the French and Indian War.
One of these was John Campbell, Earl of Loudoun, a Scotland-born royalist who arrived in America in 1756. Loudoun served briefly as commander-in-chief during the first years of the French and Indian War. He was an inept military leader and unpopular with American colonials, of whom he held a dim view.
On arrival in America, Loudoun disregarded any limitations in the Mutiny Act and set about housing his soldiers and officers where and how he saw fit. He accomplished this by bullying and intimidating colonial politicians and civilian officials, sometimes threatening the use of military force if they failed to comply. At war and unwilling to risk a local confrontation, most complied.
On taking command, Loudoun based his contingent in Albany, New York. It became a garrison town and Loudoun ordered civilian authorities to find accommodation for the thousands of troops entering Albany. Where barracks could not be built or inns, barns or outbuildings located, soldiers were forcibly housed in private dwellings, causing considerable outrage among residents.
Loudoun’s command proved disastrous, and he was recalled to Britain in 1758. His use of intimidation and force to house British soldiers in private homes was the only well-documented example of this during the revolutionary period.
The end of war usually brings about demobilisation and a decline in the number of soldiers garrisoned in a particular place. This was not the case in the American colonies at the conclusion of the French and Indian War, where the numbers of British regulars (uniformed troops) remained inordinately high throughout the 1760s.
The retention of troops in North America was a conscious decision by the British government. Westminster remained concerned about the possibility of territorial challenges from the French or Spanish. There was also the possibility of conflict between Native Americans and settlers from the colonies, with numbers of the latter group moving westward to claim land formerly under French control.
In mid-1763, these fears were realised when Pontiac, a senior figure of the Ottawa, launched a series of attacks on British forts north-east of the 13 colonies. Pontiac’s Rebellion or Pontiac’s conspiracy, as it became known, involved numerous tribes including the Ottawa, Huron, Ojibwas, Miami, Kickapoo, Delaware and Shawnee.
A continued troop presence in America was deemed necessary both as a deterrent to these native uprisings and to mount a response to them. It might also limit the westward movement of settlers that might spark such a conflict.
The terms of the Mutiny Act were considered inappropriate for the American colonies, so Parliament, acting largely at the request of General Thomas Gage, introduced an amending bill titled the Quartering Act. This made the colonial assemblies in America financially responsible for housing, supplying and feeding British soldiers.
To members of the British Parliament, this seemed a fair deal. The colonies would contribute the cost of garrisoning troops in America, ostensibly for their own protection from foreign aggression or Native American uprisings.
The colonials and their political leaders, however, saw it much differently. They had not asked for the permanent of deployment of British soldiers in America, nor had they been consulted about the matter. Since the French and Indian War was almost two years past, they saw no need for thousands of infantrymen in colonies which were not at war.
Colonial objections to the presence of British soldiers also stemmed from a fear of standing armies that was prevalent at the time.
During the 18th century, armies were generally only raised in times of war or crisis. Few nations kept standing armies of regular troops in times of peace. Indeed, England’s 1689 Bill of Rights specifically prohibited keeping a standing army during a peacetime without the consent of Parliament.
Having thousands of British soldiers permanently stationed in the American colonies was seen not just as unnecessary and insulting but potentially dangerous. It raised the spectre of Britain misusing its military power to arbitrarily impose its authority, potentially declaring martial law if necessary.
There were also concerns about having to host the British troops themselves. While there was considerable diversity in the ranks of the British army, the lower ranks tended to be single men of rough, working-class backgrounds, prone to coarseness, drunkenness and violence. One colonial governor described them in 1761 as “the scum of every county, the refuse of mankind… loaded with vice, villainy and chains”.
Colonial responses to the Quartering Act were mixed. Benjamin Franklin, then stationed in London, thought the measure a reasonable and necessary one. British members of Parliament who supported the colonists in opposing the Stamp Act also welcomed the legislation.
The response in the colonies ranged from suspicion to outrage. Some saw it as another attempt to impose arbitrary taxation on the colonies. Others interpreted it as attempt to forcibly billet rowdy British soldiers in the private homes of Americans, despite the act clearly stipulating otherwise.
For the first year or so, the Quartering Act encountered considerable opposition not just in the 13 colonies but also in Canada and Florida. As a consequence, it was rarely implemented. In New York, the colonial assembly disregarded the Quartering Act and refused to raise funds to honour its terms. This non-compliance led to the royal governor dissolving the assembly in 1767.
After a year of opposition and non-compliance, a few colonies relented and raised funds to quarter and supply British troops. Pennsylvania raised 4,000 pounds in the summer of 1766, while New Jersey also made provisions for the British regiment there. In Boston, Massachusetts governor Francis Bernard almost triggered a riot in October 1768 when he ordered British troops to be housed in the city’s Manufactory House. A rowdy mob assembled and the troops were quickly withdrawn.
Echoes of American paranoia about the Quartering Acts can be found in the United States Bill of Rights, specifically, the third amendment to the Constitution, which would later declare that “no soldier shall, in time of peace or war, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war”.
“This section of the act made abundantly clear that there would be no quartering of troops in inhabited private houses. What caused trouble, and what brought about the ultimate defeat of the act, was the section relating to soldiers’ supplies. Most colonial legislatures refused to pay, and within five years, the law was a dead letter. The Quartering Act met significant opposition and it was altered, for the original proposals went against a deeply ingrained English distrust of the military, a distrust which George Grenville himself shared.”
Merrill Jensen, historian
1. The Quartering Act was an item of British legislation passed in 1765 as an amendment to an existing law, the Mutiny Act, which regulated military discipline.
2. This act required colonial governments to assist British troops stationed in North America, by providing them with suitable accommodation and supplies.
3. The purpose of the act was to defray the costs of maintaining a significant military presence in America in case of renewed conflict with the French or Native Americans.
4. Colonial responses to the Quartering Act ranged from suspicion to outrage. Some saw it as another attempt to tax the colonies while others were concerned about the potential misuse of troops.
5. Ultimately, only a few colonies acquiesced while most refused to comply, making the Quartering Act virtually unenforceable.
